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Archbishop Stepinac resolutely denied in the court hearing that he was the 
author of the letter in question, and his attorney indicated some crucial el-
ements proving that it was a forgery. In addition to explaining the purpose 
and the peculiarities of this letter for the fi rst time, this paper shows that 
the letter is actually very useful for historiography, because the author or 
several authors behind it analysed the war situation in the second half of 
1943 by referring to relevant historical sources.
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Th e letter as an integral part of the indictment
Th e fi ery debate on October 2, 1946, which ensued aft er the public pros-
ecutor, Jakov Blažević, showed a batch of papers to Alojzije Stepinac, Arch-
bishop of Zagreb, in the court hearing with the question: “Is this your letter?” 
and aft er Stepinac, having inspected the papers at length, replied: “Th is is not 
mine”, triggered an intensifi ed persecution and denigration of Stepinac, the 
Catholic Church, and the Croatian people in Yugoslavia, which in various 
modalities persist until today.
Th at a prolonged discussion between the public prosecutor and the Arch-
bishop followed was not known until many years later, when it became possi-
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ble to inspect the stenographic records of this legal farce,1 since the Commu-
nist Party of Yugoslavia, as the actual prosecutor and organizer of the trial, 
kept silent about the Archbishop’s resolute denial in the published minutes of 
the court hearing.2 
Th e subject of this vigorous exchange of words was a letter supposedly 
dated May 18, 1943, which the public prosecutor claimed that Archbishop 
Stepinac had written to Pope Pius XII. Th e Letter was suspicious already for 
its unusual appearance: it was written on plain paper without a header, ad-
dressing the Pope in an unusual way (“Holy Father!”) and ending with an 
even more extraordinary formula (“In the Sacred Heart of Jesus[,] Yours faith-
fully…” and, although indicating Stepinac as its author, unsigned; everything 
was pointing to an unskilful counterfeiter.
One of Stepinac’s lawyers, Dr Ivo Politeo, drew the court’s attention to these 
details when trying to prove that the Letter was, in fact, a forgery (he had no 
one to accuse, and was not allowed to, but the Ustaša regime).3 Th e American 
vice-consul in Zagreb, Peter Constan, who was present every day at the court 
sessions with his personal interpreter, claimed that the court had rejected the 
authenticity of that document.4 Perhaps the vice-consul was right to conclude 
that, since in the published fi nal verdict the Letter is not mentioned.5 Th e Com-
munists nevertheless thought that the Letter could serve as an excellent propa-
ganda tool, and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) thinks so to this day. 
Owing to this letter, SPC was even more inclined to embrace the Commu-
nist regime, since it was now convinced that it would be an ally in proclaiming 
1  Hrvatski državni arhiv (HDA - Croatian State Archives), Fond (Record Group) 1561, 
Služba državne sigurnosti (State Security Service), Republički sekretarijat unutrašnjih poslo-
va Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske (RSUP SRH - Republican Secretariat for Internal Af-
fairs of the Socialist Republic of Croatia) (HR-HDA-1561), šifra (code) 6.3, Dosje (Dossier) A. 
Stepinac, Stenografski zapisnik suđenja (Stenographic Court Minutes), pp. 2306-2310.
2  Suđenje Lisaku, Stepincu, Šaliću i družini ustaško-križarskim zločincima i njihovim 
pomagačima [Th e trials of Lisak, Stepinac, Šalić, and their company for the Ustaša-Križari 
crimes, and their helpers] (Zagreb, 1946), pp. 359-363; Robin Harris, Stepinac: His Life and 
Times (Leominster, 2016), pp. 11-12; 237-238.
3 Marina Štambuk-Škalić, ed., “Dokumenti obrane u sudskom procesu protiv nadbisku-
pa Alojzija Stepinca” [Docume nts of the defense in judicial trial against Archbishop Alojzije 
Stepinac], Fontes (1996), no. 2: 203-206.
4  Memorandum entitled “Th e Zagreb Trials: Trial of the Archbishop of Zagreb, Aloysi-
us Stepinac”, Enclosure no. 2 to Despatch no. 2 dated 14 October 1946 from Peter Constan, 
American Vice-Consul, the American Consulate, Zagreb, page 3, National Archives and Re-
cords Administration (NARA), Record Group (RG) 59, General Records of the Department of 
State, document 860h.00/10/1446.
5 Harris, Stepinac, p. 267.
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Stepinac and the Catholic Church as haters of all Serbs and of Orthodoxy, and 
for the outspoken acknowledgment that around 240,000 Orthodox believers 
converted to Catholicism during the Independent State of Croatia (NDH).
Th e highest circles of SPC still like to mention the Letter, not only in order 
to prevent Stepinac’s canonization, but also using the demonization of his per-
son to condemn the Croats and the Croatian state – both the one that existed 
from 1941 to 1945, and the one in existence since 1991.
Despite the Letter’s limitations, today it can serve as a catalyst for serious 
talks between Croatia and Serbia, and their peoples. Whoever its author was, 
he used historical arguments and documents that the Croatian historiogra-
phy has known and used. Insofar the Letter off ers an opportunity to juxtapose 
historical arguments and, above all, to openly voice the mutual objections of 
Serbs and Croats concerning the “historical guilt” caused by the crimes and 
injustices committed against one another.
Th e Italian and Croatian versions of the Letter
It should be said at once that there are variants of the Letter in Italian and 
Croatian,6 and therefore one should address the issue whether the Croatian 
version was a translation from Italian or vice versa. 
Everything points to the fact that the Italian version is the original one, 
from which a Croatian translation was subsequently made. Th e Croatian text 
is in some places barely understandable owing to the poor translation. Th us, 
on page 818 of the Italian text, one reads: “Fra altri uccisero quale ‘empio co-
munista’ il vecchio Don Vide Putica di 83 anni, l’alunno della Propaganda e 
sacerdote santo (diocesi di Mostar).” Th e Croatian translation in p. 33 says: 
“Among others, they killed ‘as a Communist example’ the old Don Vide Puti-
ca, aged 83,” which shows that the translator did not know that “empio” meant 
“godless” and mistook it for “esempio” = example.  Th e translator referred to 
Don Vide Putica (translating the word “l’alunno”) as “one from the Propa-
ganda” instead of “a student of the Papal Institute of the Congregation for the 
Propagation of Faith”. In page 820 of the Italian version, where some texts in 
Latin are quoted, the translator was at a complete loss. Speaking of the Or-
thodox immigrants “qui qua confi narii turcici contra christianos pugnabant, 
nel modo del vescovo Ogramić (1672): ‘Schismatici qui nos acrius insectatur 
6 A letter with identical features in Italian was indeed among the evidence presented at the 
trial. HR-HDA-1561, šifra (code) 6.3 Dossier A. Stepinac, Sudski stup (Court pile) 6/49, omot 
(folder) 65.88 Dokazni materijali (Evidence), pp. 808-823.
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quam Turcae’ o del colaboratore di Farlati, P. Filippo Laštrić O.F.M.: ‘Hos in-
festiores hostes tolleramus quam ipsos Turcas’,” the translation runs as fol-
lows: “who fought against the Christians as Turkish border troops, as Bishop 
Ogramić (1672): ‘Th e schismatics, who attack us more fi ercely than the Turks’ 
or as Father Filip Laštrić, OFM, a collaborator of Farlati’s: ‘Th ese we consider 
to be more dangerous enemies than the Turks’.” Th is translation makes no 
sense unless the expressions “nel modo del vescovo” and “del colaboratore di 
Farlati” are translated as “as written by Bishop Ogramić […]” and “as written 
by Father Filip Laštrić OFM, a collaborator of Farlati’s” and unless one retains 
the punctuation of the Italian version.
Th e Croatian translator’s lack of skill is also evident from his erroneous 
spelling of some famous surnames. Th us, he did not know of Josip Stadler, the 
Archbishop of Vrhbosna, and used the spelling “Sosip Stagler” instead.
Although the Letter was originally written in Italian, there are neverthe-
less indications that its author was a “local man”. Th e surname of Draža Mi-
hailović, leader of the Chetniks, is always written as “Mihajlović”, which was 
a common Croatian practice. On page 810 of the Italian version, under Nr. 
2, his instructions are quoted as P. 4 and P. 5, which means “punto” and the 
next paragraph is marked as T. 8, which probably betrays a Croatian author 
who replaced “punto” automatically as “točka” (“item”). In addition, the Ital-
ian version is formulated according to the rules that were usual in diplomatic 
correspondence (for example, at the bottom of the page there are one or two 
words to the right, with which the next page then starts), which is not the case 
with the Croatian translation.
Th ere are also strong indications that the Italian version of the Letter was 
produced in a Croatian offi  ce. It is typed on a machine that had letters with 
diacritical signs (č, ć, ž). It should also be noted that, at least judging by the 
simple visual impression, both versions were written on the same typewriter.
Finally, the Letter was written by someone who was informed about the 
activities of Archbishop Stepinac at the time of writing. He knew, for example, 
that the Archbishop had written a letter handed over to the State Secretary of 
the Holy See late in May 1943, speaking about the denigrations against him 
and the Catholic Church coming from the Orthodox-Serbian propaganda, or 
the fact that Bishop Bonefačić had sent him a leafl et “To the Yugoslav na-
tionalists,” which attacked the Catholic clergy for having given its blessing to 
various murders.7 
7 Th e exact title of the leafl et was “Word of Yugoslav nationalists from the Littoral” [Riječ 
primorskih Jugoslavena nacionalista, br. I] from May 1942. Bishop Bonefačić sent it to Arch-
bishop Stepinac on June 6, 1942. Th e text of the leafl et, with a brief letter of Bishop Bonefačić, 
has been published in: Jure Krišto, ed., Katolička Crkva i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941.-
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So far, thus, we have established that the Letter was written by a person 
fl uent in Italian, whose mother tongue was Croatian (or he knew it well) and 
who knew what diplomatic correspondence should look like. Th e author was 
also well acquainted with the subject on which he was writing, including the 
historical sources, which, of course, does not rule out the possibility that there 
were more collaborators working on the Letter.
We have also established that the Croatian translation of the Letter was 
done by someone who was not particularly fl uent either in Italian or in Cro-
atian, or even Latin, and who did not know the subject matter of the Let-
ter. From this, it may be concluded that the Croatian translation was done 
subsequently, probably for the purpose of the court trial against Archbishop 
Stepinac, i.e. in the arrangement of the State Security Administration (Upra-
va državne bezbednosti - UDBA). Th us, the original Italian letter is a forgery 
produced probably in or around the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of NDH,8 and 
the Croatian translation was arranged by the Communists for the purposes of 
Archbishop Stepinac’s trial.
Judicial and historiographical debates concerning the Letter’s 
authenticity
One should, of course, say a few words about Archbishop Stepinac’s rela-
tionship with the Letter to the Pope. It can be proved beyond doubt that the 
Archbishop did not write what the public prosecutor, Jakov Blažević, showed 
to him at the show trial. As we have seen, Stepinac took a good look at the 
document and fi rmly stated that it was not his. A certain amount of ambiguity 
regarding the connection of Archbishop Stepinac with this letter to the Pope 
was caused by the Vatican newspaper L’Osservatore Romano, which on the day 
of Stepinac’s verdict, October 11, 1946, published a statement regarding the 
supposed letter of 18 May, 1943:
1945., knjiga II: Dokumenti [Th e Catholic Church and the Independent State of Croatia, vol. 
2: Documents] (Zagreb, 1998), pp. 182-186.
8 Viktor Novak, Magnum crimen: Pola vijeka klerikalizma u Hrvatskoj [Magnum cri-
men: Half a Century of Clericalism in Croatia] (Zagreb, 1948), p. 789, claims that the copy 
of Stepinac’s supposed letter to the Pope was sent to the Pope “by Duke Erwein Lobkowitz, 
Pavelić’s deputy in the Vatican, from Rome to the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs” and thereby 
refers to Suđenje Lisaku, Stepincu, Šaliću i družini ustaško-križarskim zločinima i njihovim 
pomagačima, p. 325. However, there is no such information on the said page, which is quite 
common with Novak.
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“During a discussion at the Zagreb trial held on October 2 [1946], the 
public prosecutor presented the Croatian translation of the letter that 
Archbishop Stepinac had allegedly sent to the Holy See on 18 May, 1943. 
We have been authorized to state that, aft er the research conducted in the 
State Secretariat’s Archives, some sheets dated May 18, 1943 have been 
found, but their content corresponds only partly to the summary read out 
by the public prosecutor. In addition, unlike other letters that the Arch-
bishop had written to the Holy See, this document – which passed com-
pletely unnoticed – is all typewritten without a header, in a form which 
is uncommon in correspondence with the Holy See, without a seal and, 
most importantly, unsigned.”9
Th ose who wanted to associate Archbishop Stepinac with the Letter be-
lieved that they had found a fi rm confi rmation of their charges in the sentence 
communicated by the State Secretariat: “[I]n the State Secretariat’s Archives, 
some sheets dated May 18, 1943 have been found, but their content corre-
sponds only partly to the summary read out by the public prosecutor.”
Th e debate acquired new elements and additional vigour through Jozo To-
masevich (1908-1994), an American publicist of Croatian origin. Even though 
he was not a historian, but an economist, some of his books made him an 
authority for certain circles on the history of confl icts during World War II 
in the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.10 In 2010, the second book of 
Tomasevich’s planned trilogy was posthumously published and his daughter 
had it translated into Croatian (not always of the best quality) shortly aft er-
wards.11 In an Appendix to the chapter “Th e Churches”, titled “Was the Arch-
bishop’s May 1943 Report to the Pope Genuine?”12 Tomasevich claimed that 
he had found documents at the Public Record Offi  ce in London “showing con-
9 Th e Italian original reads as follows: “In una seduta del 2 ottobre [1946.] al processo di 
Zagabria, il Pubblico Ministero ha prodotto, a carico dell’Ecc.mo Monsignor Stepinac, la tra-
duzione in croato di una lettera che l’Arcivescovo avrebbe indirizzato alla Santa Sede il 18 
maggio 1943. Siamo autorizzati a dichiarare che, eseguite ricerche negli archivi della Seg-
reteria di Stato, non si sono trovati che alcuni fogli, recanti la data del 18 maggio 1943, il 
cui contenuto corrisponde solo in parte al riassunto fattone dal Pubblico Ministero. Peraltro, 
diversamente da tutte le lettere inviate dall’Arcivescovo alla Santa Sede, tale documento - al 
quale non fu dato alcun seguito - è scritto tutto a macchina su carta non intestata, e redatto 
in forma inusitata nella corrispondenza con la Santa Sede, e senza sigillo e, quel che è più sig-
nifi cativo, senza fi rma.” L’Osser vatore Romano, 11 October 1946, p. 1, col. 3, untitled notice. 
10 Th e fi rst volume  was War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Th e Chetniks (Stan-
ford, CA, 1975) and the second War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and 
Collaboration (Stanford, CA, 2010).
11 Croatian edition: Rat i revolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945.: Okupacija i kolaboracija (Za-
greb, 2010). 
12 English edition: pp. 576-579; Croatian edition: pp. 629-644.
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clusively that Archbishop Stepinac’s report to the Vatican in May 1943, which 
he reportedly disavowed at his trial and which his counsel characterized as 
forgery, was in fact genuine“ (pp. 577-578). Tomasevich therefore concluded 
that the arguments of the Archbishop’s lawyer, I. Politeo, were ungrounded 
and that Archbishop Stepinac did not speak the truth when he denied his au-
thorship of the letter shown to him by the public prosecutor.
Despite Tomasevich’s assurance of having found the fi nal answer and re-
solved this historical enigma he jumped too quickly to the conclusion about 
the authenticity of the alleged Letter, i.e. about Stepinac’s authorship. We shall 
come back later to the documents he received at the Public Record Offi  ce. It 
should be noted here that Tomasevich did not act reasonably when ignoring 
the extensive and plausible argument of the Archbishop’s lawyer, I. Politeo, or 
not showing why he believed it was unfounded. Moreover, even a person who 
was only superfi cially acquainted with the Archbishop’s style and language, 
or with the historical facts and names mentioned in the Letter, must conclude 
that the Letter could not be his. Had Tomasevich devoted suffi  cient attention 
to the document in question, he may have noticed some details about the Let-
ter that further complicate the question of authorship.
Th us, the Letter contains these, supposedly Stepinac’s words: “In a sepa-
rate letter to the Holy See, I have answered the false and hateful denunciations 
inspired by the Serbian side and especially by the Chetniks, directed against 
the Catholic hierarchy and Catholic clergy in Croatia.” (“In un speciale scrit-
to alla Santa Sede, ho risposto alle denuncie false e dall’odio inspirate, dalla 
parte serba e specialmente da parte dei četnici, dirette alla gerarchia cattoli-
ca e al clero cattolico in Croazia.”).13 Had Stepinac been the actual author of 
the Letter, he would not have referred to another letter so ambiguously, but 
would have identifi ed it by date and by the register number, and would not say 
vaguely that he had written it “to the Holy See.” In addition, the Archbishop 
had indeed written to the State Secretary, Cardinal Maglione, namely on May 
24, 1943, and that letter was an answer to the Serbian-Orthodox accusations. 
It is illogical, however, that the Archbishop, if he were the author of the letter 
of May 18, would say that he had “[i]n a separate letter to the Holy See […] 
answered to the false and hateful denunciations inspired by the Serbian side” 
when this letter was dated May 24, 1943, and the Archbishop personally took 
it to Rome and handed it over to the State Secretariat.
Th is is not the end of ambiguities. Th e letter to Cardinal Maglione dat-
ed May 24, 1943 also contains the following sentence: “Very soon, I hope, I 
will be able to present Your Eminence with other documents that show the 
atrocities that the Chetniks had committed against the Croatian Catholic 
13 Th e alleged Letter of Archbishop Stepinac to the Pope, beginning of Point 8.
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people.”14 Th ese documents must be identical with those that the Archbishop 
had collected and sent to Msgr. Augustin Juretić to Switzerland, to which I 
will come back later. It is quite clear that the Archbishop had not yet sent them 
to the Holy See (the State Secretariat), and the letter in which he mentioned 
these documents was dated May 24, 1943. It is not logical that the Archbishop 
would have sent a letter and the documents to the Pope dated May 18, 1943 if 
he planned to pay a personal visit to the Pope and the State Secretariat late in 
May in order to submit the documentation on the engagement of the Catholic 
Church in NDH on behalf of the Jews and the Orthodox, which he also did 
and mentioned it in the abovementioned letter of May 24, 1943.
And what about the documents that Tomasevich found in London? Th e 
problem gets even more complicated when some new protagonists are intro-
duced. Tomasevich made his conclusion based on a report by the British del-
egate in the Vatican, Sir Francis d’Arcy Osborne, dated February 17, 1944.15 
However, Osborne relied on a member of the British delegation in the Vatican, 
Mr Hugh E.L. Montgomery, and the records of his conversation with the Cro-
atian priest Krunoslav Draganović, who came to the Delegation with special 
recommendations by the Holy See.
At the end of August 1943, Draganović, professor of Church history at 
the Catholic Th eological Faculty, University of Zagreb, was assigned to the 
informal Croatian representation at the Holy See and entrusted with the task 
of assisting the return of Croatian detainees from the Italian camps on behalf 
of Caritas at the Zagreb Archdiocese and the Croatian Red Cross.16 
Draganović arrived in Rome “early in September 1943.”17 However, Dr 
Dominik Mandić, a Franciscan from Herzegovina who was at that time high-
14  Blet, Pierre, Graham, Robert A., Martini, Angelo, Schneider, Burkhart, eds., Actes et do-
cuments du Saint Siège relatifs à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale [Ac ts and documents of the Holy 
See relating to the Second World War], vol. 9, La Saint  Siège  et les victimes de la guerre, Jan-
vier – Décembre 1943 (Vatican City, 1975), doc. no. 130, Annex II, pp. 221-224.
15 Foreign Offi  ce (F. O.), Coll. 371/44325, document R 5331/850/92.
16 As for his tasks and the related authority, see  Petar Vrankić, “Okviri djelovanja prof. 
Krunoslava Draganovića u Italiji (1943.-1963.) u svjetlu dostupnih arhivskih izvora i najnovi-
jih publikacija” [Th e scope of activities of Prof. Krunoslav Draganović in Italy (1943-1963) in 
the light of available archival sources and recent publications], Krunoslav Stjepan Dragano-
vić – svećenik, povjesničar i rodoljub: Zbornik radova s međunarodnoga znanstvenog simpozi-
ja o Krunoslavu Stjepanu Draganoviću povodom 110. obljetnice rođenja i 30. obljetnice smrti 
održanom na Katoličkom bogoslovnom fakultetu u Sarajevu od 8.-10. 11. 2013. godine (Saraje-
vo-Zagreb, 2014), pp. 85-87.
17 P. Vrankić, ibid., p. 85, writes on Draganović’s journey to Rome that it took place “late in 
August 1943”; cf. Draganović’s statement to the Yugoslav investigators on September 26, 1967 
in: Miroslav Akmadža, Krunosla v Draganović: Iskazi komunističkim istražiteljima [Kruno-
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ly positioned in his order, stated very precisely that Draganović arrived in 
Rome on January 16, 1944.18 Both notices are accurate, but one should keep 
in mind that Italy capitulated in the meantime (September 8, 1943), the Ger-
mans occupied Rome (September 10, 1943), and the Allies entered the Italian 
territories in the south. Th is prompted the need to change the Croatian allies 
and prevent Croatia and the Croatian people from becoming a part of some 
new Yugoslavia. In any case, Draganović was thinking in this direction and 
that is why in December 1943 he went to Zagreb, where he wanted to exam-
ine such possibilities. He talked about that with various prominent people in 
politics, culture, and the Church – undoubtedly also Archbishop Stepinac – 
because it had become the current topic among the infl uential circles of the 
Croatian society. Th erefore, it is possible to accept Mandić’s information that 
Draganović returned to Rome on January 16, 1944, but this time with the 
mission to hand over a special memorandum to the Western Allies.
Such a memorandum he indeed handed over to the representative of the 
British Embassy at the Holy See, Francis D’Arcy Godolphin Osborne, on Feb-
ruary 14, 1944, attempting to explain the Croatian situation in that political 
moment. Th e 15-point memorandum was in German, and the British Ambas-
sador at the Holy See sent the English translation to the Minister of Foreign 
Aff airs.19 He also sent a summary of the conversation that took place between 
Montgomery and Draganović.
But Draganović gave to Montgomery (and Osborne?) some papers that he 
claimed to be a copy of Archbishop Stepinac’s report to the Pope, and Mont-
gomery had included nearly two pages of citations and paraphrases from that 
report. Since these passages of Montgomery’s correspond to the contents of 
the letter that the public prosecutor presented to Stepinac, Tomasevich con-
cluded triumphantly: “We can argue that the latter document [the alleged let-
ter of Stepinac to the Pope dated May 18, 1943] was authentic.
In his memorandum, Draganović provides similar arguments as cited in 
the alleged Letter to the Pope, arguing that “the several hundred thousand 
slav Draganović: Statements before the Communist investigators] (Zagreb, 2010), p. 94; Milan 
Simčić , “Prof. Krunoslav Stjepan Draganović (1903-1983)”, Papinski hrvatski zavod sv. Jeroni-
ma (1901-2001): Zbornik u prigodi stoljetnice (Rome and Zagreb, 2001), pp. 843-854.
18 Dominik Mandić, “Moje uspomene na kardinala Stepinca” [My memories of Cardi-
nal Stepinac], Stepinac mu je ime: Zbornik uspomena, svjedočanstava i dokumenata,  vol. 1 
(München – Barcelona, 1978), p. 139.
19 Osborne to Eden (Rome, February 17, 1944), Conf. Nr. 11. Appendix to the Memorandum 
of Dr. Draganović and the note of Hugh Montgomerry, F.O. 371/44325/5331/850/92. PRO, cf. 
Dr agoljub R. Živojinović, Vatikan, Katolička crkva i jugoslovenska vlast 1941-1958 [Vati can, 
the Catholic Church, and the Yugoslav authorities] (Belgrade, 2007), pp. 70-72. 
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graves lying between the Croats and the Serbs will always remain a reason 
for blood revenge.”20 In this way, Draganović wanted to strengthen his main 
argument, namely that “if Croatia cannot continue to be completely inde-
pendent, then it certainly should not be part of the Balkan alliance, either on 
a Communist or on a nationalist basis, but part of a Western, Central Euro-
pean, Danube federation.”21 He enhanced the impression with the statement 
that all his points were “a true expression of the fi rm conviction of all positive 
agents in today’s Croatia, especially the ecclesiastical circles headed by Za-
greb’s Archbishop Stepinac.”22 
Tomasevich did not even consider Draganović’s motives in all this, but 
rather believed that what the latter said to the British diplomat was true. To-
masevich did not ask himself where Draganović obtained a “copy” of the letter 
Stepinac had written to the Pope. It is almost certain that Draganović could not 
have had a real copy of Archbishop Stepinac’s report to the Pope, because nei-
ther the ecclesiastical practice nor the Archbishop’s personal habits were such 
that he would have shared his reports, confi dential as they were, either with a 
layman or with a priest, even if these persons had important functions in the 
society or in state administration. In other cases, the Archbishop may have dis-
closed the content of his address to the Pope or the State Secretary to a repre-
sentative of the Croatian state authorities, but he never showed the document, 
let alone gave a copy of what he had submitted to the Pope to his interlocutors.23 
But of course, Draganović may have had a copy of the material produced in 
state organizations, including the alleged Letter of the Archbishop. 
Tomasevich did not even try to answer the question of the origin of the 
“sheets” dated May 18, 1943, and how and why they came to the State Secre-
tariat in such an unusual form. His conclusion actually means that he believed 
the public prosecutor’s allegation that there were segments with a similar con-
tent at the Vatican State Secretariat as the Letter, and also Draganović’s claim 
that what he had given to Montgomery was a copy of Stepinac’s letter to the 
Pope. It is possible that what was found at the State Secretariat of the Holy See 
was a part or all of the letter that Archbishop Stepinac claimed not to be his. It 
is also possible that this had come to the State Secretariat through the same or 
similar channels as it had come to the representative of the British Embassy, 
20 Draganović’s memorandum to the Allies, Point 14.
21 Ibid., Point 15.
22 Ibid.
23 Th us, Stepinac “retold” the content of his note to the State Secretary to Nikola Rušinović, 
the unoffi  cial representative of NDH at the Holy See; cf. Jure  Krišto, Sukob simbola: Politika, 
vjere i ideologije u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj [Th e Confl ict of Symbols: Politics, religions, 
and ideologies in the Independent State of Croatia] (Zagreb, 2001), pp. 49, 50, 59-64, 78-80.
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Montgomery. Nevertheless, this cannot be a proof that the Letter is “authen-
tic”, as Tomasevich claimed, i.e. that Stepinac wrote it. What Stepinac’s lawyer 
pointed out is far more important for the authenticity of the letter: namely, 
that the form of the letter and its other features, as well as the illogical aspects 
that we have indicated earlier, cannot be associated with Stepinac’s authorship.
Th e importance of the alleged letter to the Pope 
It is pointless to seek for answers to the question of the actual authorship, 
since none of the persons who could have known all the details presented in 
the Letter cannot be identifi ed as its author with absolute certainty.24 
24 Th ere were several persons in touch with the materials used for the Letter: Father Radoslav 
Glavaš as a state offi  cial in charge of political issues that also aff ected the Church (Ivo Politeo, 
defence speech at the court); cf.  Stella Alexander, Th e Triple Myth: a Life of Archbishop Alo-
jzije Stepinac  (Boulder, New York, 1987), n. on p. 161; Duke Erwein Lobkowitz, delegate to 
the Vatican; Giuseppe Masucci, secretary of the Apostolic Visitator, Abbot Marcone. General 
Vjekoslav Maks Luburić confi rmed this in the epilogue to the Croatian edition of Ma succi’s 
diary Misija u Hrvatskoj 1941.-1945. [Mission in Croatia], ed. by Marijan Mikac (Madrid, 
1967). Luburić wrote that Colonel Šime Cvitanović was in charge of collecting materials on 
Chetnik crimes and of handing them out to Masucci. On one occasion, he had met Masucci at 
Cvitanović’s, who allegedly promised to send the materials to the Vatican. Luburić’s addition 
to Masucci’s diary was published as the note 4 titled “Pro domo sua,” pp. 289-298, quote on p. 
293. Mons. Augustin Juretić must have also had something to do with some of the documen-
tation in the Letter, because Archbishop Stepinac had personally sent him the materials about 
Chetnik crimes in NDH. Prof. Draganović may have also been familiar with the materials, 
given the nature of his mission in Rome and his contacts in the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs. 
It is reasonable to assume that there were more associates or participants in the preparation 
of the Letter. In an earlier version of this paper, I indicated several reasons why I considered 
Draganović as one of the main participants in the preparation, perhaps even writing of the 
Letter. First of all, given his desire to convince the Western Allies that it would be tragic for 
the Croats to become part of the new Yugoslavia, “Stepinac’s letter” may have seemed to him 
as an extremely powerful instrument. But also the content of this allegedly Stepinac’s letter 
to the Pope points to Draganović. Knowledge of specifi c historical problems – conversions 
of Catholics to Orthodoxy at the time of the Ottoman Empire (on which subject Draganović 
had published a scholarly paper, but Politeo probably did not know it) – and the systematic 
way of addressing the issues indicates Draganović’s hand. For example, there were not many 
who could have been interested in the fate of Don Vido Putica, a priest from Herzegovina, or 
that of Zvonimir Bralo, a priest from Sarajevo who joined the Ustasha, except Draganović, 
who was a member of the same Archdiocese. As stated above, the purpose of the Letter was 
to inform the Holy See – and through it the Western Allies – about the actual events in  NDH 
and the dangers threatening the Croatian people if it were forced to live again with the Serbs, 
i.e. in the Serbian state aft er the war. Th e author or authors of the Letter, apparently, believed 
that this purpose justifi es even the implication of the Archbishop’s authorship and even used 
the Archbishop’s materials, personal refl ections, and political opinions. Th ere are, of course, 
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Th e Letter, however, is extremely important because of its content, which 
has been neglected for the fact that the Communist court used it and that it was 
thus abused for political purposes, which has remained the case until today. 
Th e Letter is, in fact, an expert analysis of Serbian Orthodoxy from the Great 
Schism to World War II, and a prediction of the further destiny of the Croats 
if the Greater Serbian and Chetnik idea won. Insofar the Letter also clarifi es 
the Greater Serbian genocide idea of  creating a Serbian territory without the 
presence of other nations, as well as the Chetnik activities aimed at eradicating 
the Croatian Catholic and Muslim populations in the imagined Serbian area. 
Th e need for such clarifi cation and interpretation was even greater because the 
Western Allies fi rmly believed from the outbreak of the war that the Chetniks 
were their allies in struggle against the Germans. Th at is why the Letter explic-
itly stated that it was not concerned with the future of Catholic Croats should 
the Bolshevik idea win, because “[...] the Communist terror has nowhere been 
carried out with such atrocities, and [...] never with such massacres of weak 
women and innocent children, as the Serbian Chetniks have done it. Where-
as the partisans kill individual persons, who belong to the ruling circles, the 
Chetniks will kill everyone who is a Catholic.” “Mentre i partigiani uccidono le 
singole persone, apartenenti ai circoli dirigesti, i četnici uccìdono tutti quegli 
che sono cattolici.”25 Th e Chetniks are, therefore, the executors of the genocide 
idea of Greater Serbia and Serbian Orthodoxy.  Th e author (or authors) guar-
antees that his arguments are backed by reliable sources, from photographs to 
quotes from offi  cial documents. Th e Italian version consists of 16 typewritten 
pages, single-spaced, while the Croatian one has 11 typewritten pages even 
though it contains everything that the Italian one does.
Th e main thesis is presented in eleven points, with Pt. 9 missing (meaning 
10 points), and in the Croatian version there are no signs for Pt. 10 and Pt. 
11, or they are not visible. Apparently, from Pt. 1 to Pt. 11 (actually Pt. 10) 
the Chetnik activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Dalmatia are analysed, 
and from p. 820 in the Italian version, i.e. p. 34 in the Croatian one, i.e. from 
remembering the thirteen hundred years old ties between the Croats and the 
Holy See, the Chetnik activities are considered in relation to the history of 
Orthodoxy in the Croatian ethnic territories.
reasons why Draganović’s connection to the entire content of the Letter could also be refuted. 
It is hard to believe, for example, that in order to corroborate his arguments he would have 
even reached for the “saving” of Catholics created by the forced conversions from Orthodoxy. 
And that is why I believe that the Letter is not a single person’s work. Nevertheless, there are 
strong indications of Draganović’s participation in its preparation, but as they cannot be prov-
en beyond doubt, I have “relegated” them here to a footnote.
25 Report of Archbishop Stepinac to the Vatican (May 18, 1943), HR-HDA-1561, code 
6.3, Dossier A. Stepinac, Stenographic Court Minutes, p. 26.
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Th e points clarifying the Chetnik goals and the Greater Serbian idea are 
the following:
1. Th e aim of the Chetnik activities is to establish Greater Serbia, be it as 
a part of Yugoslavia or not. Within the borders of the new Serbia, only 
the Serb-Orthodox population can remain, since in the Serbian Orthodox 
system only an Orthodox Christian can be a true and reliable Serb.26 Th at 
is why the Chetnik programme is “to expel the Croats and the Muslims 
from Lika, northern Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to es-
tablish a single state, completely Serbian-Orthodox, with Serbia and Mon-
tenegro as its core territories” (p. 27).27
26 Th e essence of Serbian Orthodoxy, and its role in the national shaping of Serbhood and 
the development of the ideology of Greater Serbia, has long intrigued Croatian scholars and 
writers. What both older and contemporary authors agree upon is that the medieval dynasty 
of Nemanjić played a decisive role in this, but so did the centuries-long presence of Ottoman 
rule in the Balkans. Th e main point concerning the Nemanjić was that he created not only 
a strong Serbian state, but also the Serbian Church (1219), specifi c in the veneration of its 
own saints and family patrons, so that it is possible to speak of a peculiar Serbian Christian 
tradition, which this Church calls and celebrates as “Svetosavlje” according to its founder, St 
Sava (Sabas), brother of the dynasty’s founder. I will mention only some of the authors who 
have made a signifi cant contribution to this research: L. v . Südland [Ivo Pilar], Južnoslavensko 
pitanje: Prikaz cjelokupnog pitanja [Th e South Slavic question: An overview of the subject] 
(Zagreb, 1943), reprint: (Varaždin, 1990); László  Hadrovics, Srpski narod i njegova Crkva pod 
turskom vlašću [Th e Serbian people and its Church under the Ottoman rule] (Zagreb, 2000); 
Srećko M. Dž aja, Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine: Predemancipacijski pe-
riod 1463. - 1804. [Confession and nationality in Bosnia and Herzegovina] (Sarajevo, 1992); 
Matijević, Zlatko, “Političko djelovanje dr. Ive Pilara i pokušaj rješavanja ‘južnoslavenskog 
pitanja’ u Austro-Ugarskoj Monarhiji (ožujak-listopad 1918.)” [Political activity of Dr Ivo Pi-
lar and an attempt at solving the ‘South Slavic’ question in the Austro-Hungarian Monar-
chy (March-October 1918)], Godišnjak Pilar 1 (2001), no. 1: 133-170; idem, “Državno-pravne 
koncepcije dr. Ive Pilara i vrhbosanskoga nadbiskupa dr. Josipa Stadlera. Od Promemorije 
do Izjave klerikalne grupe bosansko-hercegovačkih katolika (kolovoz-prosinac 1917. godine)” 
[Political and legal ideas of Dr Ivo Pilar and Dr Josip Stadler, Archbishop of Vrhbosna: From 
the Pro memoria to the Statement of the Clerical Group of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Catho-
lics (August-December 1917)], Godišnjak Pilar 1 (2001), no. 1: 117-131; Jure Krišto, “Izvori 
identiteta Hrva ta u Bosni i Hercegovini” [Sources of Croatian identity in Bosnia and Herze-
govina], Status 13 (Fall-Winter, 2008): 226-234; Nenad Lemajić, “Rani kontakti Srba i Hab z-
burgovaca (do Mohačke bitke)” [Early contacts between the Serbs and the Habsburgs (before 
the Battle of Mohács)], Istraživanja 25 (2014): 73-87.
27 Recently, the following scholars have written on the Chetnik movement and its activities: 
Fikreta Jelić-Butić, Četnici u Hrvatskoj 1941-1945 [Chetniks in Croatia, 1941-1945] (Zagreb, 
1979); Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Th e Chetniks (Stan-
ford, CA, 1975); Zdr avko Dizdar – Mihael Sobolevski, Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj 
i u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941.-1945. [Hidden Chetnik crimes i n Croatia, and in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 1941-1945] (Zagreb, 1999); Zdravko Diz dar, “Politički i vojni oblici četništva u 
Hrvatskoj 1945. godine” [Political and military forms of Chetnikhood in Croatia, 1945], in: 
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2. “Th e creation of a homogeneous Orthodox state should be achieved 
through the liquidation of all those who are not Orthodox, and above all 
by cleansing all Catholics from the Croatian regions annexed to this state” 
(p. 27).28 
3. Cartographic representation of Greater Serbia (see some attached maps) 
covering parts of the Hungarian, Bulgarian, Albanian, and Italian terri-
tories, as well as most of the Croatian regions. Croatia should be reduced 
to about 10% of today’s Croatian territory, i.e. to the area that can be “seen 
from the belfry of the Zagreb cathedral” (p. 29).29
4. Cleansing the territory of all Catholics and Muslims should be done in 
three ways:
a.  Massive slaughter of the Croatian people
b.  Radical plunder that will cause hunger, death, and expulsion from 
homes (pp. 29-30)
c.  Forcible conversions to Serbian Orthodoxy, which should occur espe-
cially in Dalmatia (p. 30)
5. Th e Greater Serbs feel great hatred towards Catholicism and the Catholic 
Church, and they identify Catholics with the Communists, clericalists, 
Ustashas, etc. (pp. 30-31).30a. In Vol. 8 (pp. 31-32), examples of this hatred 
1945. – razdjelnica hrvatske povijesti: [zbornik radova sa znanstvenog skupa održanog u Hrvat-
skom institutu za povijest u Zagrebu, 5. i 6. svibnja 2006.] (Zagreb, 2006), pp. 357-381; idem, 
Četnički zločini u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941.-1945. [Chetnik crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
1941-1945] (Zagreb, 2002).
28 Th ere was indeed such a programme, which bore a corresponding name – “Homogeneous 
Serbia” – elaborated on June 30, 1941 by the Bosnian Serb Stevan Moljević, a lawyer by pro-
fession. Th e most recent study on this issue is: Stjepan  Lozo, Ideologija i propaganda srpskog 
genocida nad Hrvatima – projekt “Homogena Srbija” 1941. [Ideology and propaganda of Ser-
bian genocide against the Croats: Th e “Homogeneous Serbia” project, 1941]̧ (Split: Podstrana, 
2018).
29 On Greater Serbian projects throughout history see: Bože Čović, ed., Izv ori velikosrpske 
agresije. Rasprave, dokumenti, kartografski prikazi [Sources of Greater Serbian aggression: 
Debates, documents, maps], (Zagreb, [1991]). In the 1990s, the Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag 
line was considered as ideal; cf. Mih ailo Stanišić, Projekti Velika Srbija [Projects of Greater 
Serbia] (Belgrade, 2000).
30 Hate is not a static category; it persists in constant kindling, in two stages: the object 
of hatred is presented as worthless, miserable, criminal, so worth of contempt, by means of 
various propaganda instruments: lies, forgeries, defamation, and exaggeration concerning 
one’s own victims, accusing the nation in the focus of hatred. Th e aim of such kindling 
of hatred is to trigger avenge instincts: the second stage is to destroy the object of hatred 
thus depicted. Such dynamics can be easily identifi ed in the anti-Croatian hysteria during 
the 1980s, which ended in a military action against the Croats and an attempt to destroy 
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are listed, from both further und recent past. Josip Stadler, Archbishop 
of Vrhbosna, is presented as a “moral monster, a picture invented by the 
them by means of crime and persecution in the early 1990s. Cf.  Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidara, 
and Neven Šimac, Etničko čišćenje: Povijesni dokumenti o jednoj srpskoj ideologiji [Ethnical 
cleansing: Historical documents on a Serbian ideology] (Zagreb, 1993).
Ideas of Greater Serbia in recent history. Map published by Ž. Milosavljević, Srps-
ko-hrvatski spor i neimari Jugoslavije [Serbo-Croatian Dispute and the Architects 
of Yugoslavia], second edition (Belgrade, 1938-1939). 
1. Blue dotted line - Crippled Croatia according to the 
plan of the president of Yugoslav government and leading 
Serbian politician Nikola Pašić from the 1920s
2. Red dotted line – Th e plan of Serbian military occu-
pation in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina by Serbian 
colonels Simović and Antonijević from November 1918
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Greater Serbian propaganda.”31 Th at same propaganda accused the priest 
Zvonimir Bralo that, at the time of NDH, he killed some Serbs with his 
own hands in the village of Alipašin Most near Sarajevo. Such libels con-
tinued even aft er the Croatian government sentenced the perpetrator of 
that terrible deed to death (p. 31). A Chetnik newspaper denigrated the 
papacy and Catholicism by comparing them to a poison that “drop by 
drop infests the Croatian people over the centuries, penetrating the most 
hidden cells of its moral being.” For everything that was not good either 
in the former Yugoslavia or in NDH, the Greater Serbs accuse “the papacy 
and Roman Catholicism, that strange tree on the Serbian soil that needs 
to be cut and destroyed if the Serbian people wants to be happy and free.”32 
Here is also the source of the Greater Serbian accusations that the Catholic 
clergy was directly responsible for crimes against Serbs in NDH and that 
it directly participated in them (p. 32).33 
b. Th is hatred towards Catholicism and the Catholic Church results in 
the demolition of Catholic churches, desecration of hosts and chalices, 
and massacre of Catholic believers, priests, and nuns, whereby the 
perpetrators oft en “carry the Chetnik insignia, that is a skull, on their 
caps by day, and a red star in their pocket, and vice versa by night” (pp. 
32-33).34
31 A recent study on Archbishop Stadler is:  Zoran Grijak, Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog 
nadbiskupa Josipa Stadlera [Political activity of Josip Stadler, Archbishop of Vrhbosna] (Za-
greb, 2001). Cf.   Pavo Jurišić, ed., Josip Stadler: Život i djelo: Zbornik radova međunarodnih 
znanstvenih skupova o dr. Josipu Stadleru, održanih od 21. do 24. rujna 1998. u Sarajevu i 12. 
studenoga 1998. u Zagrebu [Josip Stadler: Life and work: Proceedings from international con-
ferences held from 21st to 24th September 1998 in Sarajevo and 12 November 1998 in Zagreb] 
(Sarajevo, 1999).
32 In the Serbian Church, there were many such claims, even in offi  cial documents issued by 
its leadership: see, among others,  Ljubica Štefan, Srpska pravoslavna Crkva i fašizam [Serbian 
Orthodox Church and fascism] (Zagreb, 1996); eadem, Mitovi i zatajena povijest [Myths and 
hidden history] (Zagreb, 1999).
33 Th e same accusation was repeated in a letter sent by the Serbian Patriarch Irenej with 
his Synod to Pope Francis on April 30, 2014. Th e text of this letter is circulating in the Ser-
bian media, mostly online, e.g. at the portal Srbija danas (Serbia Today), https://www.srbi-
jadanas.com/vesti/srbija/ekskluzivno-pismo-patrijarha-irineja-papi-stepinac-je-cutao-ka-
da-su-ustase-ubijale-pravoslavne-2016-10-16 (last accessed on May 24, 2017). Even though it 
cannot be proved that SPC gave the text to the media, it has never denied that it was indeed 
the text of the Letter, on which basis I consider it as authentic.
34 Identic behaviour could be seen in the Serbian army and paramilitary formations that 
arrived from Serbia during the recent war against Croatia and the Croats in the early 1990s. 
See the book by a Serbian author:  Milorad Tomanić, Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj [Serbian 
Church at war and wars within it] (Belgrade, 2001). 
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c. Th is hatred dates back to the Turkish times. Catholic authors com-
plained as early as the 14th century that the Catholics were persecuted 
in Serbia, that schismatic dioceses and monasteries were founded in 
the hitherto Catholic lands, and that the Serbs “tore down and devas-
tated the churches of the Latins, attacked and imprisoned their priests, 
and did great evil” (p. 34), while those from the 17th century claimed 
that the Orthodox schismatics were “worse than the Turks.” Th eir po-
litical domination resulted in the conversion of “entire Catholic re-
gions to the Oriental schism” (p. 35).35 
d. In former Yugoslavia, the Serbian Church invested extraordinary ef-
forts in money and human resources to have as many Catholics as 
possible converted to Orthodoxy. Th e future metropolitan of Zagreb, 
Dositej, even travelled to sub-Carpathian Russia and the Republic of 
Czechoslovakia, where he “converted more than 100,000 Greek Cath-
olics to the schism” (str. 35).36 Others invested similar eff orts in Mace-
donia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, so that these and oth-
er activities resulted in a loss of 200,000 believers in Catholics from 
mixed marriages” (p. 35).37
e. Th e conclusion of considering these processes is as follows: “Advance-
ment of the Eastern schism among the Catholics is today threaten-
ing with utmost seriousness to attain its dark goals. Th e victory of the 
Greater Serbian idea would mean the destruction of Catholicism in the 
north-western Balkans, in the State of Croatia. Th e mentioned docu-
ments do not leave any doubts. Moreover, there is no doubt that such a 
fatal event would have further consequences, far beyond the borders of 
Croatia. Waves of Orthodox and off ensive Byzantinism would strike 
at the borders of Italy, while now they are clashing against the Croa-
tian bulwark” (p. 36).
35 Cf.  Krunoslav Draganović, Massenübertritte von Katholiken zur “Orthodoxie” im kroa-
tischen Sprachgebiet zur Zeit der Türkenherrschaft  [Mass transfers of Catholics to “Ortho-
doxy” in the Croatian language area during the period of Turkish rule] (Rome, 1937).
36 Of course, he is celebrated in the Serbian Church as following the injunction “Go… and 
baptize them…,” as evident in some Serbian online portals. On the level of historiography, see 
more extensively:  Kamilo Dočkal, “Udio Srbske crkve u češkom reformnom pokretu” [Serbi-
an Church and its role in the Czech reform movement]: Part 1, in: Život 23 (1942), no. 2: 260-
293; Part 2, in: Život 24 (1943), no. 1: pp. 46-65; Part 3, in: Život 24 (1943), no. 2: 134-143..
37  Janko Šimrak, “Dokumenta o martiriju grkokatolika u Bosni” [Documents on the mar-
tyrdom of Greek Catholics in Bosnia], Katolički list 13 (1926), pp. 173-179; idem, Arsen ije 
Crnojević i unija: Na osnovu arhivskih izvora u Zagrebu i Ri mu [Arsenije Crnojević and the 
union: Based on archival documents in Zagreb and Rome] (Zagreb, 1935).
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Finally, the role of the Croatian state is revealed here: “According to the 
natural order of things, [...] the progress of Catholicism is closely linked to the 
progress of the Croatian State, its survival to the latter’s survival, its salvation 
to the latter’s salvation.” Th e author is convinced that the collapse of the Cro-
atian state would be devastating: “[...] its decline or fatal reduction [...] would 
not only destroy those ca. 240,000 converts from Serbian Orthodoxy, but also 
the entire Catholic population of so many territories with all their churches 
and monasteries” (p. 36).
Archbishop Stepinac and the issues discussed in the letter to the 
Pope from May 18, 1943 
We have seen why Stepinac could not be the author of that letter and why it 
is most certainly a forgery. Stepinac would have, however, agreed with most of 
what is stated in it, as it would also have been the case with many ecclesiastical 
and lay personalities in Croatia at the time, at least those who were interested 
in politics. Moreover, the Archbishop had written on some of the aspects con-
tained in his supposed Letter to Msgr. Augustin Juretić (1890-1954), who was 
at that time, and following Stepinac’s advice, staying in Switzerland.38 Th e letter 
to Juretić bears no date, but from the context (a new wave of arrests of Zagreb’s 
Jews by the Gestapo) it can be concluded that it was written in May 1943. Along 
with the letter, Stepinac sent to Juretić “by confi dential route” “many things that 
you will need in order to inform correctly the Catholic circles there and inter-
nationally.”39 Th ese must have been photographs of Chetniks, maps, and written 
documents that illustrated what he wrote to him. We do not know what his 
“confi dential route” was, but we know that in his international correspondence 
the Archbishop used the services of the Swiss consulate in Zagreb.
Undoubtedly, the Archbishop wrote to Msgr. Juretić on the Chetnik 
crimes against the Croats and their collaboration with the Italians in this 
criminal activity: 
“Th e collaboration between the Italians and the Chetniks in annihilating 
our people is a fact known to everyone. Th ey have asked an Italian offi  cer 
for clarifi cation, why are they destroying the Croats and not the Serbs? Th e 
38 Batelja, Juraj, ed., Blaženi Alojzije Stepinac - svjedok Evanđelja ljubavi: Životopis, doku-
menti i svjedočanstva – prije, za vrijeme i nakon Drugoga svjetskoga rata [Blesse d Alojzije 
Stepinac - Witness of the Gospel of Love: Biography, documents, and testimony - Before, dur-
ing, and aft er the Second World War], Knjiga (book) 2: Dokumenti I, br. 1.-399. (1933.-1943.) 
(Zagreb, 2010), document 312, pp. 481-484.
39 Ibidem.
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answer was that the Serbs were not dangerous because they did not know 
anything about the sea, whereas the Croats were dangerous as seafarers. 
I am attaching some documents, which clearly show what this Chetnik 
movement of the notorious “legendary hero Draža” actually is. Nothing 
but an ally of Italy, because it is known that “Draža” is the Chetnik com-
mander, and the Chetniks are Italian allies in the extermination of our 
suff ering people. Th ese photographs will show you how nicely Italian offi  -
cers and Serbian bearded priests in Chetnik uniforms march together. Th e 
partisans are hinc et nunc indeed less dangerous for the Croats, and thus 
for the Catholics, than the Chetniks. For the partisans only take revenge 
against those who were prominent Ustashas, but the  Chetniks slaughter 
everyone they can, and aim for the total extermination of Croats and for 
establishing Greater Serbia. Of course, one should not have any illusions 
about the future concerning the partisans either, or the Russian Bolshe-
vism. All that brings annihilation of religion and nationality.”40 
So, the Chetniks – both civilians and clerics – led by Draža Mihailović, 
are “Italian allies in the extermination of our suff ering people” and pose a 
greater danger to the Croats than the partisans, because they “aim for the 
total extermination of Croats and for establishing Greater Serbia,” although 
“one should not have any illusions about the future concerning the partisans 
either.” To confi rm these allegations, Stepinac supplied photographs, maps, 
and written documents to Juretić.
But where did he get these materials? It is known that Kvirin Klement 
Bonefačić, Bishop of Split and Makarska, noted down the crimes of Chetnik 
accomplices against the Catholic clergy and laymen, in which the Italians di-
rectly participated,41 and that he also sent a detailed report on the political 
situation in Dalmatia, including the Chetnik crimes, to the Pope.42 It is not 
to be excluded that the bishop had formerly sent the same materials to the 
Archbishop of Zagreb and the president of the Episcopal Conferences, as he 
had previously sent other materials to the bishops.43 Bonefačić’s report to the 
Pope was also complemented with documents.
40 Ibidem.
41  Mile Vidović, Kvirin Klement Bonefačić, biskup splitski i makarski za vrijeme komunis-
tičkog režima 1944.-1954. [Kvirin Klement Bonefačić, Bishop of Split and Makarska during the 
Communist regime, 1944-1954] (Split and Metković, 2015), pp. 358-365.
42 HR-HDA-1561, šifra (code) 6.3 Dossier A. Stepinac, Sudski stup (Court pile) 6/49, omot 
(folder) 65.88, Letter of Msgr. Bonefačić to the Pope, January 25, 1944. Th is is the Croatian 
version. Th e Bishop’s style is rather heavy and vague, with lots of inserted clauses, even within 
other inserted clauses.
43 On June 4, 1942, Bishop Bonefačić sent a copy of the leafl et “Riječ primorskih Jugoslavena 
nacionalista, br. 1” [Word of Yugoslav nationalists from the Littoral, Nr. 1] to Burić, Bishop of 
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 It is also known that the NDH state services collected information 
about the crimes of military and paramilitary units hostile to Croatia, and 
that before the capitulation of Italy they were ready to share this information 
with non-governmental institutions, which may have included Archbishop 
Stepinac.
Regardless of where and how Archbishop Stepinac obtained the informa-
tion on the Chetnik crimes and the Italian assistance, he shared them with 
Msgr. Juretić with the remark that he should be cautious and not mention his 
name, and that he should judge whom these materials can be shown and de-
livered; in fact, he advised him to destroy his letter. It should be kept in mind 
that the materials sent by Stepinac to Juretić were also accompanied by visual 
and written documentation.
Obviously, the alleged Letter of Archbishop Stepinac to the Pope speaks 
of the Chetnik crimes against the Croatian people, with attached documenta-
tion that confi rms such reports. It is therefore possible to speak of the similar-
ity of descriptions in the letter that was defi nitely written by the Archbishop 
and the anonymous one, of which the public prosecutor wanted by all means 
to have the Archbishop acknowledge his authorship. Nevertheless, this by no 
means implies, as Tomasevich would want it, that the letter shown to Arch-
bishop Stepinac by the public prosecutor was authentic.
Conclusion
Th us we have obtained the answers to the most important questions re-
lated to Archbishop Stepinac’s alleged Letter to the Pope, dated May 18, 1943. 
Although the Archbishop could have easily agreed with the general tone of 
the Letter, since those were his opinions as well, he could not acknowledge his 
authorship and the Letter did not meet some of the basic criteria that would 
indicate it. Insofar the claim of scholars who have considered the Letter as 
authentic remains erroneous and also reveals their superfi cial treatment of 
documents and the complex historical circumstances.
Th e Communist authorities misused the Letter by drawing from it what-
ever served them to accuse Stepinac, particularly the claim in the Letter that 
the downfall of the threatened Croatian state would have also endangered the 
Catholic Church and result in the loss of those 240,000 converts from Ortho-
doxy to Catholicism.
Senj. Th e text with the attached letter has been published in: Jure Krišto, ed., Katolička Crkva 
i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941.-1945., knjiga (book) II, doc. 169, pp. 182-186.
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We have also come to the insight that the main message of the Letter was 
not what politics has determined it to be. It has turned out important be-
cause it off ers a serious analysis of political and war circumstances, as well 
as suggestions for a better future. A particularly important analysis is that of 
Serbian Orthodoxy and the Greater Serbian idea, which caused problems at 
the time of writing the Letter and threatened the Catholics with annihilation. 
We have also made it clear that Stepinac was not opposed to the political 
analysis of war circumstances and the prospects for the future as articulated 
in the Letter, which is not evident from the Letter itself – since he did not au-
thorize it – but from the one sent to Msgr. Juretić.
Finally, we have identifi ed some individuals who may have been acquaint-
ed with specifi c parts or the entire content of the Letter. We have also seen 
why Dr Draganović seems to have been well acquainted with the entire con-
tent of the Letter and why he seems to be the best candidate, although not 
necessarily the only one, to be considered as its author.
At this point, however, there is no conclusive evidence and therefore this 
paper, although solving some crucial dilemmas related to the Letter, may be 
seen as actually inviting scholars to engage in further research based on new 
documents.
Nützliche Fälschung: über die Wichtigkeit des angeblichen Briefes des 
Erzbischofs Stepinac an den Papst vom 18. Mai 1943
Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit wird die Schlussfolgerung von Jozo Tomasevich über die 
Authentizität des angeblichen Briefes des Erzbischofs Stepinac an den Papst 
vom 18. Mai 1943, trotz der Tomasevichs Berufung auf relevante archivali-
sche Quellen, als falsch beurteilt. Schicksal dieses angeblichen Briefes wur-
de von kommunistischen Behörden bestimmt, indem sie den Brief für po-
litische Zwecke der Beschuldigung des Erzbischofs Stepinac missbrauchten. 
Das machten sie vor allem durch die Angabe im Brief, dass Untergang des 
kroatischen Staates für die Katholische Kirche auch einen möglichen Verlust 
von 240.000 Konvertiten vom orthodoxen zum katholischen Glauben verur-
sachen würde. Die Serbische Orthodoxe Kirche beruft  sich auch heutzutage 
auf den genannten angeblichen Brief von Stepinac nur deswegen, weil sie be-
tonen will, dass Stepinac gestanden hat, dass solche Zahl von Orthodoxen 
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zum Katholizismus in der Zeit des Unabhängigen Staates Kroatien überge-
treten war. Nach einer gründlichen Untersuchung des wirklichen Inhaltes 
dieses Briefes, der in italienischer Sprache geschrieben wurde, zeigte sich, es 
sei ein Dokument von außerordentlicher historiografi scher Bedeutung. Das 
ist eigentlich eine seriöse Analyse politischer und Kriegsumstände, besonders 
aber die Analyse der Folgen von Ideen des Svetosavlje und des Großserben-
tums. Es wird nur nebenbei bemerkt, wer am qualifi ziertesten war, um die 
im Briefe befi ndlichen Inhalte zu formulieren. Es ist wichtig zu betonen, dass 
der Brief eigentlich die fachliche Analyse der Orthodoxie und der politischen 
Rolle des serbischen Svetosavlje von der Kirchenspaltung bis zu Geschehnis-
sen im Zweiten Weltkrieg sowie des Voraussehens des künft igen Schicksals 
von Kroaten, falls die großserbische tschetnische Idee in die Tat umgesetzt 
würde. Wesen der großserbischen Idee liegt in ihrer völkermörderischen Prä-
gung, denn die Verwirklichung dieser Idee schließt physische und geistige 
Zerstörung anderer Religionen und Nationen in den von dieser Idee als ser-
bisch beanspruchten Territorien ein. Verfasser oder Verfassern dieses Briefes 
wollten den westlichen Alliierten sowie der Vatikan-Diplomatie erläutern, 
dass eine Nötigung der Kroaten, noch einmal in einer Staatsgemeinschaft  mit 
Serben, Befürwortern dieser völkermörderisch geprägten Ideen, zu leben, zur 
Vernichtung eines Volkes (Kroaten) und der Katholischen Kirche auf diesen 
Gebieten führen würde. Die Notwendigkeit einer solchen Erläuterung und 
Deutung war umso größer, weil die westlichen Alliierten seit dem Beginn des 
Krieges davon streng überzeugt waren, dass die Tschetniks ihre Verbündeten 
im Kampf gegen Deutsche in Jugoslawien waren. Deswegen wird im Brie-
fe ausdrücklich gesagt, dass die Zukunft  der Kroaten, falls bolschewistische 
Idee siegte, überhaupt nicht erwägt wird, weil „[…] kommunistisches Terror 
nirgendwo mit solchem Gräuel durchgeführt wurde und […] niemals solche 
Massaker an schwachen Frauen und unschuldigen Kindern verübt wurden, 
wie es jene von serbischen Tschetniks angerichteten Massaker waren.”
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